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Abstract 
 
Classical conditioning is at the heart of most learning 
phenomena. It is thus essential that we develop accurate 
models of conditioning; since, psychological models rely 
heavily in verbal accounts that are necessarily imprecise it 
has become apparent that the development of computational 
models is imperious. However, we need to separate the 
wheat from the chaff. In this paper we review the main uses 
of the term computational model in conditioning. 
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Introduction 
 
It is universally accepted that conditioning is at the basis 
of most learning phenomena and behavior: Indeed, models 
of associative learning have proved to be relevant to 
human and non-human learning both theoretically and in 
practice (Wasserman & Miller, 1997; Pearce & Bouton, 
2001; Hall, 2002; Schachtman & Reilly, 2011). It is thus 
paramount that we develop accurate models of 
conditioning. In this enterprise, collaboration between 
computer scientists and psychologists has enjoyed 
considerable success (Schmajuk, 2010a; Alonso & 
Mondragón, 2011): Connectionist models have been used 
to better predict discrimination and categorization 
phenomena (Shanks, 1995). In addition it has been argued 
that classical conditioning rules can be naturally 
interpreted as an instance of more comprehensive 
computational neuroscience models (Dayan & Abbott, 
2001; Schmajuk, 2010b).  
This collaboration is sustained on various arguments: 
Expressing models in the form of algorithms provides us 
with formal ways of representing psychological insights 
and of calculating their predictions accurately and quickly; 
from computational models we also borrow a view on 
how information is processed, a computer analogy that has 
proved useful in understanding cognition; moreover, the 
underlying architectures of computational models, for 
instance the hidden units of an artificial neural network or 
the way feedback is computed in recurrent networks, 
resemble the mechanics of associative learning both at a 
conceptual and neural level; finally, machine learning 
models, such as  temporal difference learning and 
Bayesian learning, can be understood as effective 
abstractions of the way associations are formed and 
computed.  
In this paper we analyse critically the assumptions upon 
which such arguments are built. We identify two main 
trends in so-called computational psychology, more in 
particular in the use of computational models in the study 
of conditioning, namely, as simulators and as 
psychological models in themselves.  
 
Computational Models as Simulators 
 
Firstly, a computational model can be understood to be an 
implementation of a (pre-existing) psychological model. 
Simulations serve two main purposes: On the one hand, 
implementing a model requires precise definitions –be it 
in the form of a specific programming language or as a 
formal model, that in turn makes the original 
psychological model “accountable”. On the other hand, 
algorithms allow us to execute calculations rapidly and, 
most importantly, accurately. Automation is critical, 
particularly when the models are described in non-linear 
equations that can only be solved numerically as it is the 
case of recent psychological models of conditioning 
(Balkenius & Morén, 1998; Vogel et al., 2004; Mitchell & 
Le Pelley, 2010; Schmajuk & Alonso, 2012). Crucially, 
the outputs of a simulation feedback the psychological 
models –thus becoming an essential part of the cycle of 
theory formation and refinement.  
It is worth noting though that the benefits derived from 
using implementations do not spring exclusively from the 
formal specification of the psychological models in 
equations and algorithms. Per se, such descriptions 
constitute a mathematical model, a necessary yet no 
sufficient condition for a formal model to be 
computational. The essence of a computational model lies 
in the fact that it is implemented. According to this view, 
in psychology, the same as in computational physics and 
in computational biology, a computational model is a 
model that has been simulated.  
This view it is not without detractors: It has been argued 
that a model is computational if it is “implementable” –
even if it was not originally described as a full-bodied 
computational model. We think that this is an abuse of the 
term computational since any psychological model of 
conditioning would fit this definition. To use a 
parallelism: This use of the term “computational” would 
make all models of physics since Galileo’s computational. 
This brings up a subtler issue: We are using the term 
computational model in a “modern” sense. Indeed, a 
computational model is just a formal model of 
 computation and “computation” does not necessarily 
require its implementation in a computer. Mathematically, 
the notion of computation is a formalization of the concept 
of algorithm, a mechanical or automated procedure to 
prove theorems proposed by Alan Turing to attack 
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem (Turing, 1937). Modern 
computers are mere physical instantiations of the abstract 
machines that would compute such procedures. But they 
don’t play a fundamental part in the definition of 
computation. Indeed, such definition was proposed well 
before the first digital general-purpose computers had 
even been designed. Contrarily, our position is that a 
computational model needs to be implemented in a 
computer. Otherwise, a computational model does not add 
anything to what constitutes a mathematical model in its 
own right. 
We would also like to comment on a second potential 
source of confusion about the term computational –that 
comes from cognitive science rather than from 
mathematics. The term “computational” has been linked 
to David Marr’s Tri-Level Hypothesis on vision where the 
“what” refers to the computational level, the “how” to the 
algorithmic level and the “where” to the implementational 
level (Marr, 1982). However insightful such analysis may 
be, clearly what Marr referred to as “computational” is 
“psychological” –when applied to cognition. Insisting on 
talking about psychological models as if they were 
computational based on such taxonomy is, in our opinion, 
a source of misunderstanding. 
 
Computational Models as Psychological 
Models 
 
The second use of the term “computational” is more 
controversial: A computational model can be considered a 
psychological model in itself. We argue that this position, 
a milestone in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, 
is a misuse of the term. Let’s illustrate our contention 
using a paradigmatic example: The use of Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANNs) in the study of conditioning has 
been advocated at several, inter-related levels that we are 
now analyzing. 
 
Ontological Level  
ANNs are considered material models of conditioning. 
The underlying reasoning is that (a) ANNs model by 
analogy natural neural networks and that (b) psychological 
processes, including conditioning, are ultimately 
embedded in natural neural networks; hence, indirectly, 
ANNs model conditioning.  
However appealing this line of argumentation may be, it 
is widely acknowledged that ANNs do not resemble 
natural neural networks in any fundamental way (Enquist 
& Ghirlanda, 2005); besides, there is no strong evidence 
suggesting that electrical or chemical neural activity and 
associative learning are related (Morris, 1994) –or for that 
matter, that psychological processes can be localized in 
specific brain regions as recently exposed in (Vul et al., 
2009), but already advanced in (Uttal, 2001).  
Even if it did, a neural analysis would not necessarily be 
the right level to study associative learning phenomena. In 
the words of Burruhs F. Skinner “The analysis of 
behaviour need not wait until brain science has done its 
part. The behavioural facts will not be changed (…). Brain 
science may discover other kinds of variables affecting 
behaviour, but it will turn to a behavioural analysis for the 
clearest account of their effects” (Skinner, 1989, pp. 18). 
Regardless of the antipathy that Skinner’s radical 
behaviorism provokes among neuroscientists such an 
statement does not contradict a version of reductionism 
that most of them would endorse, namely, Richard 
Dawkin’s hierarchical reductionism (Dawkins, 1986).  
 
Formal Level 
 
Relatedly, that a version of Dirac’s rule can be taken as a 
model of both neural plasticity and long-term potentiation 
effects –the Hebbian rule (Hebb, 1949)– and association 
formation –for example, Rescorla and Wagner’s rule 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972)– cannot be considered as 
proof of any common underlying structure and should not 
be used as an argument to reduce psychological 
phenomena to their alleged neural substratum.  
Likewise, that Rescorla and Wagner’s rule is essentially 
identical to the Widrow-Hoff rule (Widrow & Hoff, 1960) 
for training Adeline units and that, in turn, such a rule can 
be seen as a primitive form of the generalized delta rule 
for backpropagation only tells us that, computationally 
speaking, associative learning follows an error-correction 
algorithm
1
. What a computational model does not tell us, 
however, is which underlying psychological processes 
(attention, motivation, etc.) intervene in associative 
learning or how the physical characteristics of the units 
involved (e.g., the salience of the stimuli) affect such 
processes. 
Clearly, sharing a common formal expression does not 
imply that the phenomena so expressed are of the same 
nature: For instance, power functions can be used to 
express the relationship between (1) the magnitude of a 
stimulus and its perceived intensity (Stevens’ law), (2) the 
metabolic rate of a species and their body mass (Kleiber’s 
law), and (3) the orbital period of a planet and its orbital 
semi-major axis (Kepler’s third law). Stressing this point, 
allow us to quote Richard Shull “The fact that an equation 
of a particular form describes a set of data will does not 
mean that the assumptions that gave rise to the equation 
are supported. The same equation can be derived from 
very different sets of assumptions” (Shull, 1991, pp. 246). 
Put it another way, if the meaning of a 
mathematical/formal model is in the linguistic expression 
it takes (that is, if there is a unique isomorphism between 
phenomena and algorithms) then either (a) we cannot 
explain how a theory can be expressed in different sets of 
equations or (b) we will not be sure about the effect the 
addition or the removal of a simple parameter may have. 
Paraphrasing (Chakravartty, 2001), theories and models 
can be given linguistic formulations but theories and 
models should not be identified with such formulations.  
 
 
                                                
1
 Incidentally, backpropagation is merely a mathematical 
procedure to deriving partial derivatives –that was originally 
proposed to model nationalism and social communications not 
neural networks (Werbos, 1974). 
  
Representational Level  
ANNs are connectionist models according to which 
information is not stored explicitly in symbols and rules 
but rather in the weights (strengths) of the connections; 
learning would consist of changes in such weights. It is 
claimed, rightly, that these are precisely the assumptions 
associative learning models are based upon and hence, 
wrongly, that ANNs are an ideal candidate to model 
associative learning. This quite straightforward argument 
is, in fact, a fallacy: As connectionists (at least 
implementational connectionists) themselves concede the 
way we represent learning, either as continuous changes 
of weighted connections or as the result of discrete 
symbolic processing, is a matter of convenience and 
therefore irrelevant to the study of the structures involved. 
Interestingly, this debate has centered in the difference 
between associative models and computational models of 
conditioning (Leslie, 2001): It is understood that 
associative models are historically and conceptually 
linked to connectionism (Medler, 1998) whereas 
computational (aka symbolic) approaches take their ideas 
from information processing (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2001). 
In this debate we agree with Peter R. Killeen in 
identifying both approaches as formal (Killeen, 2001): 
Turing machines and ANNs (as well as RMA machines, 
the Game of Life, and any programming language) are 
both computational models
2
; in particular, Turing 
Machines and ANNs are equivalent in their input/output 
behaviour, that is, they compute the same problems and 
accept the same languages (Chomsky, 1956)
3
.  
 
Functional Level  
ANNs typically approximate solutions by iteratively 
minimizing an error function. And this can be understood 
as a type of learning that resembles learning by “trial and 
error” of which associative learning is an example. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that ANNs merely 
implement numerical methods. They are statistical tools –
with a misleading name, and certainly not the simplest, 
fastest or most efficient techniques (see, e.g., Mitchie et 
al., 1994). On the other hand, associative learning models 
such as Rescorla and Wagner’s express dynamic laws: 
Against public opinion, animals do not make predictions 
and iteratively update an associative value through error 
minimization towards an optimal one. The associative 
value at a given time is the right associative value –that 
exactly describes to which extend the CS has become 
associated to the US. Let’s put it another way: In standard 
conditions, if the animal “learned” a CS-US association 
after one single exposure then the animal would be wrong 
and its corresponding behaviour un-adaptive (unless, of 
course, we exposed it to a very salient US like in flavor-
aversion learning). That the system described by Rescorla 
                                                
2
 It should be noticed moreover that the first mathematical 
models of (A)NNs, in particular McCulloch and Pitts’s 
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) and Turing’s B-type machines 
(Turing, 1948) were intended to formalize logically, i.e., 
symbolically,  the notion of learning.  
3
 Provided that the values of the weights are restricted to rational 
numbers (Orponen, 1994). 
and Wagner’s rule is limited by an asymptote (the 
reinforcing value of the US) does not confer any special 
status to such value –rather it just defines a constraint of 
the system. 
 
Structural Level  
We are told that the layout of an ANN, the way units are 
connected between layers, can be seen as a cognitive 
architecture and, as such, as a psychological model. Let’s 
take a computational example to counter-argue this point: 
In computer science network communication is modeled 
according to the so-called Open Systems Interconnection 
model (OSI) (Zimmerman, 1980), moving from the 
physical layer that describes the electrical specifications of 
the devices the networks consist of up to the application 
layer that describes how the user interacts with a given 
piece of software. The question is: Why don’t we use the 
OSI model as a psychological model? At the end of the 
day, structurally, OSI would make as good a 
psychological model as an ANN. In fact, the OSI model 
implements a hierarchical and integrated architecture, that 
is, the type of cognitive architecture that a computational 
model should allegedly support (Sun, 2008). Thus that 
ANNs are networks implemented in architectures that take 
advantage of massive computational parallelism – not 
surprisingly, the new connectionism landmark paper 
introduced the Parallel Distributed Processing paradigm in 
cognition (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), does not 
confer them any psychological advantage: Any complex 
network would do (Newman et al., 2006).  
 
Philosophical Issues 
  
A final more general reason to explain the appeal of 
computational models in psychology rests on the idea that 
both computers and the brain are information processing 
systems, instantiations of a universal Turing machine or 
any other model of computation. But this alone does not 
justify the support the “computer metaphor” enjoys. After 
all, any phenomena can be expressed in terms of some sort 
of computation. If this is such a powerful metaphor is 
because it is deeply rooted in Western philosophy and the 
mechanization of (formal) reasoning, reformulated in the 
twentieth century in terms of computation. That 
computation has been effectively embedded in computers 
has reinforced the idea that so it is in the brain, that the 
study of the former will help understand the latter and, in 
a tour the force, that computers may be capable of 
displaying intelligence. Indeed, every scientific theory is 
shaped in the context of its age's achievements and 
prejudices: Like Newton's laws of mechanics strengthened 
the view of the Universe as a deterministic machine that 
worked as the sophisticated clocks so popular at the time 
our conception of the mind as an information processing 
machine has certainly been influenced by the development 
of computing technology.  
And precisely because of its generality the information 
processing model is not necessary or sufficient: Working 
physicists do not model electrons, atoms or galaxies as 
information processing entities –be it in the form of a 
cellular automaton as envisaged in (Zuse, 1969) or as a 
participatory universe (Wheeler, 1990); on the other hand, 
 neither (computational) physicists nor the public would 
presume that the simulation of a nuclear reaction 
generates real energy or that a flight simulator really flies. 
Of course, this does not preclude physicists from 
theorizing about what type of information is contained in a 
physical system (see, for example, literature on quantum 
entanglement or black holes) or about exploring the 
physical limits of computers (pioneered by Richard 
Feynman (Hey & Allen, 2000) and followed up to 
contemporary theories of quantum computing (e.g., 
Vedral, 2006)). 
 
Model Selection 
 
The discussion on what a computational model of 
psychology constitutes affects how we select models and 
in turn may help us determine what a computational 
model “truly” is.  
Selecting a model, psychological or not, described in 
natural language or mathematically, is a difficult task that 
relies in formal definitions and methods as well as on 
scientific practice and common sense (Kuhn, 1962; 
Feyerabend, 1975). Indeed, quantitative formulas have 
been developed to compare models based on the average 
size of the deviations from predicted values, the number 
of data points and the number of free parameters (Akaike, 
1974; Schwarz, 1978). However, relying exclusively on 
such formalisms or applying blindly Occam’s razor is not 
advisable –evaluating a model requires good judgment 
based on careful consideration of many factors, both 
technical and logical (Baum, 1983). The very essence of a 
model refers to the choices scientists make –choices that 
reflect what they consider relevant beyond the mere 
quantitative.  
Nonetheless, this analysis begs the question: When we 
assess computational models of psychology, what do we 
assess?  
If computational models are simulators we would need 
to select amongst them according to their computational 
complexity, that is, according to the time and space they 
take to make computations –complexity that is related to 
but not reducible to the algorithms they implement. In 
addition, computing tools must be tested for reliability and 
dependability against failures –which, in turn, depends on 
various factors such as programming languages, operating 
systems, memory capacity, processing speed, as well as on 
software engineering and management requirements. 
Computational models as simulators add a new level of 
sophistication. But this sophistication comes at a price: A 
computer program is not as “aseptic” as a mathematical 
description. A computer program takes life in algorithms 
and data structures that must comply with software and 
hardware specifications.  
On the other hand, if computational models are 
considered as a valid alternative to psychological models. 
Which criteria should we used to evaluate them and 
choose amongst them? There is no a clear answer to this 
question. 
 
Conclusions  
To sum it up, although the need to get influx from 
‘outsiders’ is recognized within the psychology 
community (see Townsend, 2008) computational models 
should be taken with caution. Computational models may 
provide us with complementary idealized models of 
psychological phenomena and with powerful statistical 
tools to construct models of psychological data but they 
alone are not the appropriate instruments to answer 
psychological questions. This is an obvious, hardly 
original, conclusion –and yet more often than not we read 
flamboyant news about robots that learn, think and 
experience emotions or ANNs that can do anything 
psychological models do only better. On the other hand, 
given the increasing complexity of psychological models 
developing accurate and rapid simulators to test their 
predictions is, in our opinion, a must. 
We would like to conclude with two warnings: An 
extreme case of the use of computational models as 
psychological models is what we call the “engineering” 
approach: We take psychological data and build a 
program that fits it. Since the data is psychological, it is 
argued, the program must constitute a psychological 
model. It should be obvious, however, that that 
psychological models, as any scientific model, are 
assessed against experimental data does not automatically 
make a theory that fits experimental data "psychological". 
Another variant of this approach is to propose models of 
machine/computational learning as psychological models 
of learning. As an illustration, simple programs that, to 
some extent, learn to maximize a numerical signal by trial 
and error have been presented as a “theory of mind” 
(Sutton, 2003).  
To summarize: The adjective "computational" in 
computational physics or computational biology refers to 
the use of computational tools, typically simulators and 
numerical processors but also data mining and data 
analysis techniques, to study data and phenomena as well 
as to assess the predictive power of theories and models. 
We suggest we “limit” the use of the term 
“computational” the same way when applied to 
psychology. 
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